

## NARRATOR (CONT'D)

Despite government pressure, surprisingly few Americans actually built fallout shelters, apparently recognizing they would offer scant protection in the event of nuclear war or that such a war might not be worth surviving.

## THE REAL MISSILE GAP

*me*  
Clip of McNamara with Gilpatric. Graphic comparing U.S. and Soviet arsenals in 1961. "Gilpatric Warns U.S. Can Destroy Atom Aggressor," NYT, 10/22/61, p.1. Still and clips of Power.

## NARRATOR

Having won election, in part, by exploiting the fear of a missile gap, Kennedy asked McNamara's to quickly ascertain just how big the gap was. It took only three weeks to confirm that an enormous gap did exist, but it was in the U.S. favor. The U.S. had 450 ICBMs. The Soviets only 4. The U.S. had more than 3400 deliverable nuclear bombs. The U.S. had 1,300 heavy bombers to the Soviets' 155. Assistant Secretary Roswell Gilpatric publicly flaunted U.S. superiority when he announced in October that the U.S. "has a nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy move that brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction....The total number of our nuclear delivery vehicles, tactical as well as strategic, is in the tens of thousands." SAC Commander Gen. Tommy Power was not pleased by this revelation, having based his enormous funding requests on the contention that the U.S. faced a dire crisis. Refusing to go quietly, he began spotting Soviet missile sites everywhere, disguised as grain silos, monastery towers, and even a Crimean War Memorial. Power, a LeMay protege who had led the firebombing attack on Tokyo in WWII, opposed all efforts to constrain SAC.

(MORE)

*not known  
in films!*

*me*

*date? ?*

*40!*

*NO*

*192 ?*

## NARRATOR (CONT'D)

In December 1960, when briefed by RAND's William Kaufmann on the need to avoid targeting civilians, he exploded: "Why do you want us to restrain ourselves? Restraint! Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to **kill** the bastards!" He added, "Look. At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian, we win!" Exasperated, Kaufmann responded, "Well, you better make sure that they're a man and a woman." Despite the fact that U.S. nuclear superiority was vast and growing, the Joint Chiefs wanted to increase the number of missiles to 3000. McNamara settled on 950 as the lowest number he could get away with under the circumstances.

(Copleston)

Gen. - Russell?  
Comment to WINK  
on NYT story

1000

Phil Brennan, C-4  
6000?

## SOVIETS RESPOND

Clips of Soviet bomb tests. Still of Doomsday Clock.

## NARRATOR

Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky interpreted Gilpatric's statement to mean that "the imperialists are planning...a surprise nuclear attack on the USSR and the socialist countries." The Soviets responded by detonating a 30 megaton bomb--the biggest ever exploded--two days later. The next week they tested a 50 plus megaton bomb, which they could just as easily have made 100 megatons. McNamara later acknowledged that a surprise first strike was indeed one of the options under the SIOP--an option Gen. LeMay was openly advocating.

me! Mel Lubliner?

(?)

(?)

de Haast

## ROBERT LOWELL

Still of Lowell.

## NARRATOR

War seemed terrifying close in the fall of 1961.

(MORE)

## NARRATOR (CONT'D)

a "terror campaign" against Cuban refugees, including sinking a boatload of Cubans escaping to Florida; hijacking attempts against U.S. aircraft that would be pinned on the Cuban government; staging a Cuban government shoot down of a civilian airliner ("the passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday"); "an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack"; and "a series of well coordinated incidents...in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces." These would include blowing up ammunition inside the base, starting fires, burning aircraft on the base, lobbing mortar shells, inciting riots, and sabotaging ships. In April 1962, 40,000 Marines and sailors participated in Operation Ortsac--a mock invasion of a Caribbean island replete with the overthrow of its government. The message was clear. Ortsac was Castro spelled backwards. In January, the U.S. coerced Latin American countries to suspend Cuba's membership in the OAS. The Soviets correctly concluded that the invasion was imminent.

EGL - need for  
US invasion

## EARLY KENNEDY STATEMENTS ABOUT VIETNAM

Clips showing French exploitation of Vietnamese. Clips from Kennedy speech to American Friends of Vietnam 6/1/56.

## NARRATOR

Intent upon standing up to the Communists after the Bay of Pigs and Vienna, Kennedy understood the difficulties the U.S. would face in Vietnam.

(MORE)



## NARRATOR

The last thing the Soviets wanted in 1962 was a direct military confrontation with the United State. With little more than 20 ICBMs that could reliably reach U.S. soil and fewer than 300 nuclear warheads, they stood no chance against America's 5,000 nuclear bombs and nearly 2000 ICBMs and bombers. Fearing a U.S. first strike, the Russians gambled that placing missiles in Cuba could both deter an attack on themselves and protect Cuba against an anticipated U.S. invasion. Khrushchev also saw this as an inexpensive way to placate Kremlin hawks. Having deliberately misled Kennedy with promises that no offensive weapons would be placed in Cuba, he said he wanted to give the Americans "a little bit of their own medicine" and show them "it's been a long time since you could spank us like a little boy--now we can swat your ass." Khrushchev equated Soviet missiles in Cuba with U.S. missiles on Russia's border in Turkey and in Western Europe. Kennedy did not agree.

10 ? (38 build?)

well...

## AMERICANS WEIGH RESPONSE

NSAM 196 (Oct. 22, 1962)--establishment of ExComm. Still of ExComm members in meeting. Clip of LeMay with JFK. Still of McNamara with JFK. Announcement of blockade scrolling across NY Times building in Times Square. Washington Post cover with Headline "Kennedy Orders Blockade of Cuba as Reds Build Nuclear Bases There; U.S. Will Sink Defiant Arms Ships." Clips of U.S. ships during blockade and Soviet ships moving toward them. Journal American Newspaper cover: "'Highest National Urgency;' JFK Talks to Nation Tonight." Clip of Kennedy speech 10/22/62.

## NARRATOR

Kennedy hoped to stop the Russians before the missiles had been fully installed. He called together ExComm, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, to advise him on his options. The majority, led by LeMay, favored an air strike to destroy the missiles. (MORE)

in EAComm?  
No

## NARRATOR (CONT'D)

LeMay advised, "The Russian bear has always been eager to stick his paw in Latin American waters. Now we've got him in a trap, let's take his leg off right up to his testicles. On second thought, let's take his testicles too."

LeMay assured Kennedy that the Russians would not respond to an attack on the missiles in Cuba. Kennedy replied that they would have to respond--if not in Cuba then in Berlin. LeMay welcomed that possibility, believing the time was ripe to not only overthrow Castro, but to obliterate the Soviet Union. Most wanted the strike to be followed by an invasion. Those less ready to risk war preferred a blockade.

McNamara, whose position oscillated throughout the crisis, contended that the presence of Soviet missiles did not change the strategic balance. Kennedy agreed but believed that allowing the missiles to stay would have devastating political consequences in Latin America and beyond. Kennedy also confided to his brother Robert that, if he didn't take strong action, he would be impeached. But, in the coming days, he rejected the advice of his military leaders, of civilian hardliners Acheson and Nitze, and of former President Eisenhower, and opted for the blockade, which he referred to as a "quarantine" to downplay the fact that this too was an act of war. On October 22, he informed the American people:

## KENNEDY

"The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear capability against the Western Hemisphere."

## THE CRISIS INTENSIFIES

Still of Khrushchev. Clips of U.S. missiles and Martin B-26 Maruder bombers in flight. Clips of B-52s being refueled in flight. SAC photo of soldier standing in front of

ref?  
Keffler?  
narrator

?

?

and in US!  
impossible

?

## NARRATOR (CONT'D)

At the height of the crisis, a U-2 plane "accidentally" strayed over Soviet territory protected by jets armed with nuclear air-to-air missiles and, unbeknownst to the Americans, a Soviet nuclear missile battery was moved to 15 miles from the U.S. base at Guantanamo, ready to blow it to smithereens. War drew closer by the second. In a last-ditch effort, Robert Kennedy met with Ambassador Dobrynin on October 27 and told him the U.S. was about to attack unless it received an immediate Soviet commitment to remove its bases from Cuba. He promised to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey within three months but only if Soviet leaders never publicly disclosed this secret agreement. Going to bed that night, McNamara thought he might not live to see the sunrise. In that case, millions of others would have died with him. Fortunately for everyone, Khrushchev decided that it was not worth the slaughter of hundreds of millions or more in order to save face. The next morning, the Russians announced that they would withdraw the missiles. The crisis was over. Or was it? Although the American public breathed a sigh of relief, the crisis actually continued for three more weeks. Kennedy also demanded that the Soviets remove their Il-28 bombers from Cuba on the grounds that they could potentially carry nuclear weapons and that the Russians cut military personnel on the island down to 3,000. For Khrushchev, acceding to this demand was complicated by the fact that the planes now belonged to Cuba. On November 11, Khrushchev made an offer similar to the one Robert Kennedy made to Dobrynin. He offered his "gentlemen's word" that he would remove the Il-28s at some later date. Kennedy demanded that he publicly announce their immediate withdrawal. The U.S.

(MORE)

ref ?  
recent  
Dobbs

2d threat

RFR/me

X

improvement

Kenney / JFK



for Chap 16 C-II Keynote

404 99- Berlin

100- Testing

405 comp. 7

109 Halpate

nes. of compas

112- WWK/Power

113 MM

114 - Malicious on Halpate

Report 30MT 58MT

115 Kelley

116 Powell

118 Mergson

119 March 1962 Walters pretext

April 62 Outline

for map

[125 VPK on devines

? 412 - number of low workbooks 300? 124

"From US ES? (or thrusts, over Berlin - Halpate

From

125 start  
what year and

X - NO - DE on too much Stroganov

127 VPK Tracy "Major order

413 128 Kelly

414 Kelly understood Badi? NO

129 VPK on Kelly

"esp. is Lt" ?

(130) <sup>Kelly</sup> Mirvich (Stevenson)

131 VPK not shrink

415 "Jh" (=K)

SAC flt arrives 3000 hrs

133 Sebles sub?

a Saw B-59 sub

134 Artwipow - sub

140

"New VPK rejected, being..."

O-2 "accidentally", protected f...

136 McN

137 K on RPK



donalds saw tracks? NO

138 further's question? JFK turned down?

419 33 S-4 missiles? 42?

SS-5's shipped

139 two nos

- expecting 10,000 SUVs (14,000) 100,000 Gens

expected 4800 US dead 18 K co.

"later" based 43,000 280 Gens

McN - 25 K US dead (?)

140 would have refused entry  
NO

141 McN on JCS

142 JFK on K

143 shuttle?

- K out in 1963? NO

found occupation of two things with empty bodies  
(Berlin?!)

147

B. 422 JFK + K (Comins)

(see file + K: Sergei?)

150 Comins AC (draft?)

151 McN on withdrawal

McN to Herold on " 1962? or 1963?

153 JFK - Bouthett

424 McH-T not promised or visited. withdrawn

155 when he discussed publicly

425

158 JPR - more

431 mis. comp in Antenna in March 63?

Ann '62 7 Dysin (Lilly)

174 3d Bg of Pigs

436 (and in the SC?)

K out -

---

10 NSAC 273 change?

11 McCone out - own VN?!

SEA

14 HCL

19

25 McCone - LBJ (for more being?)

26 LBJ on in bill

443

27 Whelan 1M was 7 years (1972)

28 on McN & more 29 CW



July 22 '65 500.000K used; 4 ?  
Chinese + 300K

X [LRE and 50,000: 100K

33 Harold Johnson, 8 stars

447 New 65 Maj. Charles Cooper, sent to Andrew (?)  
(34)

35 China, RT

36 McNamee

CIA convinced? No, (B)

Aug 66 - Kelly PP? NO - 1967

McN  
39 Long paper

40  
450 - Loyalty - on McN

New - (McN memo of Nov 1)  
being

453 46 Arnold Walter vs. memo of the same:

1964 "Drapers Pte" meeting ?

84 Harold March 27 '64

55 56

59 April 11, 1968 Am. Bureau

63 Volante den pol.

474 = H<sup>3</sup> got no balls — on N/Chenault

N 68 for Communist? Mexint?  
78 big Helen — passing CIA

(Mex vs. Indonesia 65	Holland
Brazil 64	Alaska
Chile (Wood Bank, 71	Antley
(Dan Rep) 65	Morronegh
(Perr?)	(Sikorski)

504 ASW — passing thing — NO

807-08 (DP — good:

+ deal not gotten copies to 7  
(gain independent... was to get

100 ["but after the election, when we will be the way —

511 ["during negotiations"  
[Dan — Frederick breakin April

511 [Can cut off funds in '73...]

(Dec 72 on Cuba — after this war...)

2,756 MT on Korea = WWII + Korea

113 — Butterfield to DE?

Dan Prime — unknown? (N?) (FBI / CIA?



519 Sebles - Lee News, 1975?

522 Seales of direct surveying

Paisley?

529 papers + West Bump, "Continuing"?

(Center had nominated Seales for  
for Pres. at '72 Dm Cere

531 Center chad.

540 SU version of apper  
frag-fer

546 PD-59 no-cites, fruit  
(by plan?!) )

547 doubled words

549 Dates as false alarm 1980

McKenny - as Vane computer  
descriptions of words